Democracy implies, if nothing else, citizen participation in crafting the political institutions those same citizens inhabit, even if the actual contours of such participation have been widely contested. Majoritarian voting procedures and public deliberation are the two most popular implementations of the ideals of democratic rule, but they do not exhaust the entire field of possibilities. Zhang Shizhao 章士釗 (1885Shizhao 章士釗 ( -1973, an early twentieth century Chinese political thinker, uses the participatory promise of democracy to challenge China's traditional elitism and bureaucracy, but he privileges "self-awareness" (自覺) rather than a form of collective action as foundational to this democratic practice. Although Zhang wrote shortly after the establishment of republican government in China, and during a time of unprecedented Western influence, his "selfaware" individual bears a more than superficial resemblance to the literati-bureaucrats who were the primary political actors under the Chinese dynastic empire. However, while contemporaries invoked the literatus ideal to claim a right to educate and manipulate the masses, Zhang recasts the literatus posture to formulate a new form of political action: one that disaggregates the "group" (群) concept central to contemporary elite political thinking, and in turn opens greater spaces for political participation. In the process of elaborating the requirements of self-awareness, and demonstrating its efficacy in building a regime of self-rule where none existed before, Zhang shows how thinking about political action in an individualized rather than collective way can leverage resources for changing shared human environments that would otherwise be overlooked.
Democracy implies, if nothing else, citizen participation in crafting the political institutions those same citizens inhabit, even if the actual contours of such participation have been widely contested. Majoritarian voting procedures and public deliberation are the two most popular implementations of the ideals of democratic rule, but they do not exhaust the entire field of possibilities. Zhang Shizhao 章士釗 (1885-1973), an early twentieth century Chinese political thinker, uses the participatory promise of democracy to challenge China's traditional elitism and bureaucracy, but he privileges "self-awareness" (自覺) rather than a form of collective action as foundational to this democratic practice. Although Zhang wrote shortly after the establishment of republican government in China, and during a time of unprecedented Western influence, his "selfaware" individual bears a more than superficial resemblance to the literati-bureaucrats who were the primary political actors under the Chinese dynastic empire. However, while contemporaries invoked the literatus ideal to claim a right to educate and manipulate the masses, Zhang recasts the literatus posture to formulate a new form of political action: one that disaggregates the "group" (群) concept central to contemporary elite political thinking, and in turn opens greater spaces for political participation. In the process of elaborating the requirements of self-awareness, and demonstrating its efficacy in building a regime of self-rule where none existed before, Zhang shows how thinking about political action in an individualized rather than collective way can leverage resources for changing shared human environments that would otherwise be overlooked.
I evaluate Zhang's model through an extended engagement with the work of Hanna Pitkin, who throughout her career has specifically addressed-as a problem for and of democratic politics-the kind of individualized action that Zhang advocates. By self-awareness, Zhang means the ability of individuals to see their political and social selves critically and imaginatively, in the context of China's immanent post-revolutionary political demise. He triangulates from these 2 particular vantage points a new republican regime, built on the incremental changes that accumulate as individuals shed their roles as imperial subjects and envision themselves as citizens of a republic.
Although Pitkin shares with Zhang his sympathies for individually differentiated action in the process of founding polities, she would argue that his model threatens to individually impose, rather than collectively craft, the conditions and goals of political life. Self-awareness implies a tyrannical process of manipulation, because the self-aware individual in effect assumes the role of an "epic" political theorist (to borrow Sheldon Wolin's term) 1 in which he sees other people as objects and himself as the only relevant decision-maker. 2 Pitkin emphasizes the need for the theorist to overcome such tyranny by dissolving the "I that theorizes" into a participatory "we that acts." Her argument reflects a widespread democratic impulse to resist any orders -even abstract ones -that are not truly the product of all who are affected by them. 3 Her work offers a particularly bold counterpoint to Zhang's insistence that only the awareness of and by individuals can constitute a foundation for political action that neither imposes nor invites tyranny.
My argument below does not attempt to defend the entirety of Zhang's vision of "selfawareness" as much as use Pitkin's arguments to sketch its limits and possibilities, especially with respect to the relationship between political action and political theory in a context of irreducible plurality and political breakdown. Zhang's exhortations to "self-awareness" may not provide an exhaustive account of political action under mature regimes, but it does draw attention to the difficulties of concerted action when taking steps radical enough to stop the inertia both Pitkin and Zhang find so inimical to self-rule. This is particularly so in situations where a community's members have not yet built democratic relationships among each other, or cultivated particular shared commitments, to make coordinated action in concert possible. In these kinds of situations, the unilaterally initiated, individual awareness that Zhang encourages seems both necessary and 3 effective, even as it courts a dangerously atomized political self. Recognizing this danger, we can exploit its critical edge: self-awareness ultimately interrogates the identity of political action with collective action, even as it provides a conceptual framework to think about how disparate individuals qua individuals can gain traction on shared problems before collective action is possible.
The Problem of Theory
Zhang wrote and thought in an environment marked by unprecedented intellectual and political upheaval in China. For most of his influential, early career, Zhang argued for a constitutionally limited parliamentary cabinet system modeled after that of Great Britain. 4 His support of constitutionalism in an era of revolution embraced rule of law over the radical politics of Sun Yatsen and his revolutionary factions, leading many modern-day commentators on Zhang's work to focus exclusively on his contributions to institutional design and political reform. 5 Zhang's arguments for constitutionalism did help to elaborate an institutional framework during the republican era, but I focus in this essay on Zhang's often overlooked theoretical reflections on the establishment of republican rule in China. For Zhang, theoretical explanations grew more central to his defense of constitutional democracy in the years following 1911, after the elected President Yuan Shikai dissolved the national assembly and began centralizing his control over the fledgling republic. 6 Many contemporary thinkers blamed not institutional design but China's low level of political education for this turn of events, and endorsed as an antidote elite-led, top-down transformations of Chinese social and political practices. 7 Zhang countered these suggestions primarily on a theoretical level, understanding the issue in terms of how the founding of a new tradition of constitutional democracy could abide by the principles of self-rule it hoped to secure. In this description of "self-awareness," Zhang portrays the disjuncture between some ideal state of affairs and a gravely troubled political reality as an actual physical pain, and therefore most acutely felt on the individual register. 10 It is this individual pain that prompts reflection on "how I can act as a king," in the process transforming the individual from an imperial subject to one who participates in ruling. As Zhang portrays it here, self-awareness is a process of interrogating who the rulers are supposed to be, and how those who do rule undertake effective action in the world.
His establishment in 1914 of
Although an implicit part of rule by "the people," because it in some way constitutes the agency of the people's history, the headache that facilitates self-awareness nevertheless does not entail questions about membership and exclusion, as much as a cultivation of a particular, internal selforientation. With the turn to individualized feeling, Zhang reduces government by the people (民)
to an awareness of and by the self (here articulated as the "I," 我). Zhang insists that the very process of an individual coming to a realization and making a decision is precisely what constitutes the state; indeed, once this realization is made, "the work of creating a state is already half-done."
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Acquiring self-awareness to Zhang is thus a process that fosters democratic practices and subjectivities spontaneously, without recourse to the top-down control Yuan Shikai and foreign advisors like Frank Goodnow were advocating. Its goal is to motivate the differentiated comprehension by China's citizens that the "loss of the state" (亡國) is a direct result of their personal disengagement from both social and political life. 12 The "loss of the state" is a term traditionally identified with the fall of a dynasty, but Zhang reinterprets it to mean the loss of the republican polity to authoritarian rule-a loss caused not by deliberate political manipulation, but by an unconscious perception that the immanent collapse of the republic is a matter of fate rather than a matter for (individual) human intervention. 13 Such desperation drove many of Zhang's compatriots to flee abroad, smoke opium, or give up on the constructive everyday activities that 6 kept Chinese society functioning. 14 21 These characteristics of action in a community of self-rule suggest that Zhang's attempt to found a republican polity should turn away from individual theorizing, and build instead on the insight that founding new political regimes is ultimately a "co-founding"-a process of mutual recognition by citizens of their shared tasks, hopes, and responsibilities. 22 According to Pitkin, the 8 ideal of a lone founder, "an auctor who initiates and induces the free actions of others, so that his project becomes what they willingly carry out," is a "fantasy solution" to the problem of making citizens. 23 If theoretical exercises like self-awareness are to be effective and meaningful politically, they must be political interventions-that is, linked to the "concerted action" that for Pitkin defines politics. 24 This means relating "I" to "we," promoting decisions for effective intervention made in the name of and by the community collectively. 25 Pitkin's account is valuable because it links republican commitments to equal participation with their concrete, real-world efficacy, teasing out the implications of the fact that the world can never be the creation of any one individual even when he acts with absolute political authority. At the same time, however, she leaves underspecified the precise steps by which individual theorizing relates to collective self-rule, and this oversight has important consequences for how future changes in an existing political system can take place. On the one hand, Pitkin does place the agent at the center of any strategy to change those conditions of inertia and self-indulgence that in early work she calls "drift." In Blob, Pitkin associates these conditions with "the social": a situation "in which a collectivity of people-for whatever reason-cannot (or at any rate do not) effectively take charge of the overall resultants of what they are severally doing." 26 Yet on the other, her solution is ultimately the establishment of politics "where politics could and should be," the spontaneous engagement by a community of "shared self-government, public freedom." 27 She revises an earlier fear about the unique potency of the lone theorist to affirm that such capacity for theory and for action is really more diffuse than she had originally portrayed it, 28 but continues to characterizes the "isolated deviant individual" who works to change political institutions as "utterly helpless": for Pitkin, action "must take the form of concerted action if it is to help us." 29 In fact, individual actions cannot be "political" until they are read in terms of the coordinated, collective efforts to 9 which they contribute. 30 This interpretation of "political" action does not deny the importance of individual capacity, but it does insist that we must act with others before we can become effective at changing reality, or before our unilateral interventions into a wider community can be authorized.
Yet the problem with conditions of "drift" or "the social" is precisely that collaborative efforts of "co-founding" and concerted action are not forthcoming, and therefore cannot be relied upon as vehicles for change, or for the "rejoining of the concrete and general, local and large-scale"
that both she and Zhang seem to be pursuing. 31 Pitkin claims at one point that the community is "always already free to become free," meaning that the spontaneous coalescence of individuals in public action only awaits a revival. 32 But even this possibility assumes a context of political experience that can be remembered or made accessible by reference to existing concepts and practices-a difficult task even for the "thoughtless," but much more so for those living in communities that have not "forgotten" this "lost treasure" of public freedom, but have never in their history experienced it. 33 She tells individuals to "just do it!", all the while characterizing their solitary actions as nonpolitical and ineffective. Zhang's turn to "self-awareness," after years of advocating distinctly institutional measures for political betterment, wrestles with these very difficulties of presuming public, concerted action as the primary antidote to social inertia and political collapse. By formulating a different relationship between theory and political action, Zhang explores alternatives to collective action as a device of social and political change.
Beginning from before 1913, when the so-called "second revolution" to oust the increasingly predatory Yuan Shikai from power ended in failure, Chinese intellectuals were faced with the apparent collapse not only of the republican regime, but of politics more generally. The twin realms of "society" (社會) and "culture" (文化) became new sites of elite manipulation and reform as polity-building receded in the face of its apparent uselessness. 34 Zhang and his colleagues 10 at The Tiger gained fame during this debate for defending the need to "talk about politics" (論政) and to attend to politically-centered measures of social betterment, including reform of the provisional constitution. 35 Institutionally, Zhang advocated a system of provincial self-rule to help local communities secure their political autonomy against top-down control from an increasingly authoritarian center. 36 Yet in light of repeated failures to consolidate the republic and to achieve consensus even on fundamental matters of institutional design, Zhang's defense of the meaning and efficacy of political action eventually needed to address the political in a way that did not turn on concerted action or existing institutions-at that time, the possibility of acting together with others was precisely what a model of political action needed to explain. Unlike Pitkin's co-founding citizens, whose mutual recognition emerges from a spontaneous, "renovating return to beginnings," 37 Zhang and his contemporary Chinese have nothing to return to, except an imperial past they have already forsaken. Their ideal republic lies only in the future and in their (disparate)
imaginations.
In this context, Zhang formulates a relationship between the individual theorist and the wider community that focuses on the capacity of lone individuals to act, but that does not abandon a republican characterization of political authority as diffuse and ground-up. Although in many ways complementary to Pitkin's account, Zhang nevertheless suggests that thinking about an individual's political action as necessarily oriented toward coordinated action with others can sometimes obstruct rather than inspire those personal transformations that both he and Pitkin believe shape shared political environments. The exercises in self-reflection and imaginative visualization that constitute self-awareness disaggregate larger political transformations into personal commitments, prompting individuals to act precisely when and because others are not acting.
11 Individualism During the crisis in political faith that followed the failure of the "second revolution" and Yuan's subsequent consolidation of executive power, Zhang's defenses of the self and its relevance to political outcomes grew more elaborate. 38 These defenses are most explicit in a pair of essays Zhang published in 1916 and 1917. One, titled "Beginnings" (發端), inaugurated the new daily edition of his journal The Tiger. The other, titled simply "Self" (我), appeared in the Eastern Miscellany, one of the longest-running and influential Republican-era journals, known for its focus on issues of self and psychology and their relationship to politics. 39 In these essays, Zhang specifies the dangers of "forgetting the self" (忘我) and the urgent need for "searching for the self" (求我) by explaining the relationship between the self and the external world.
The self is not something one person gets and then keeps to himself…What individuals are engaged in doing has its own logical space. This is called "the self". This passage suggests the mechanism by which Zhang expects his self-aware individuals to make an impact. The "self" becomes "unbounded" -that is, effective -not by communicating directly and purposefully with others, or by engaging in the kinds of political behavior that typically mark democratic regimes, such as voting, mass action, or holding political office. Rather, by attending to his own talents, integrity and courage, the self-aware individual becomes "linked to the social mores and minds of others" via the ambient changes his actions have in the world that go on to inspire responses. Zhang describes these efforts as "a light in a room": their divisibility or diffusion does not negatively affect their potency, and may even increase it as others see the light and bring themselves in line with the exemplary moral behavior these efforts strive toward.
That means to have effect on others, one does not act in concert with them, deliberate with them, or even negotiate with them. Instead, self-awareness prompts one to re-fashion the external environment in a manner that allows one to "exercise one's due portion" by "using one's talents" without denying to others the chance to do the same. 41 This is a politics of exemplariness and local action, in which one's self-awareness as a republican citizen will inspire others to act by example to do as you do. 42 Engaging the wider world both changes oneself, and one's own incremental self- Pitkin's thoughts on "theory" can rescue Zhang on this point, by explaining how individual particularity can strengthen rather than fragment a regime of self-rule. Like other republican thinkers, including Arendt, Pitkin recognizes the individual "both as the source of initiative and as the locus of moral value and dignity." 46 Similarly, when Zhang attributes to self-awareness the exclusive power to "dissolve the nation and rebuild the nation," and "effect the regeneration of dead tissue" that is the state, in part he means to underscore the capacity of individuals to resist the "false nationalism" that denies the constitutive role of individual particularity in defining the public 14 good. 47 Zhang's work on individualism, in fact, influenced contemporary Chinese intellectual trends such as the student-led May Fourth movement, which saw in the affirmation of individual worth an important remedy for the traditional hierarchical ethics of imperial Confucianism. 48 Yet part of the reason Pitkin's defense of the individual makes sense is because such action, as both she and Arendt read it, "is always interaction," linked to others equally involved in the common enterprise of politics. 49 May Fourth activists, including Hu Shi, also were careful to situate individualism, the "small self," within the "great self" of society and its demands. Read in these terms, Zhang's concept of "self-awareness" develops a much-needed account of the personal shifts in orientations as individuals transform themselves from imperial subjects to republican citizens, but he does not offer an immediate response to either his contemporary critics or to the basic principles of modern, self-ruling communities. By leveraging individual sensations and orientations, Zhang seems to be heightening rather than resolving the tensions between individual efforts to change reality, on the one hand, and the recognition that, in Hannah Arendt's words, "men, not man, live on earth and inhabit the world," on the other. 50 Rather than bridging that gap between self and community, self-awareness seems to further widen it.
Read in terms of contemporary Chinese intellectual dilemmas, however, another paradigm care for "all under Heaven" 51 -even as republican rule necessarily changed the way in which these intellectuals identified the proper "subjects" and "objects" of political life. 52 These conceptual puzzles about the status of intellectuals remained an important part of the unexamined assumptions of Chinese political theorizing well past the 1911 revolution. 53 Zhang, I
argue, responds to these puzzles by revising the literatus ideal in light of what he identifies as a diffuse capacity for self-awareness. Invoking the literatus as a model not of elite leadership, but of the union of political efficacy and theoretical reflection, Zhang believes self-aware individuals can perform a similar synthesis of acting and theory that enacts political authority in the process of interpreting it.
Literati Action
Influenced by neo-Confucian cosmology, in which self-reflection could both reveal and correct the larger patterns in the external world, the imperial Chinese literatus stood at the center of political action under late dynastic rule. As everyday executive of the law, upholder of the community's moral character, and interpreter of the morally and politically authoritative canon of Classics, it was the literatus, not the ruler, who perceived himself as primarily responsible for effecting the "moral juncture" between normative and actual authority. 54 According to the historian Thomas Metzger, as a matter of both institutional and conventional practice the cultivated literatus 16 alone had the capacity for political admonishment, constituting in his person the "ultimate vehicle of moral insight" into a world that saw authority as ultimately lodged not in one's social superiors, but "in the structure of the cosmos itself as something accessible without mediation to each individual will." 55 The literatus' insight was buttressed by the executive power derived from his position within the Chinese imperial bureaucracy, but also by the belief that "while the external cosmos was seen as tending organically to unite ultimate being and experienced events, the mind had a diffuse, transnatural power to bring this tendency to full realization. That is, the ethical activity of the individual could cause vast changes in the social and metaphysical world." 56 In the manner of imperial literati, Zhang assumes that individual acts of being aware are both necessary and sufficient for uniting the normative and empirical authority that constitute democratic sovereignty. Although not usually associated with the self-cultivation theorists who drew explicitly from these neo-Confucian traditions in the early republican era, Zhang nevertheless banks here on their metaphysical assumptions. 57 The "inner" moral struggles of his self-aware individuals are meant to mediate, however imperfectly, the "external" reality of the institutions those individuals both create yet remain aloof from. No longer interpreting the Classics, individuals nevertheless remain loci for interpretive insight into what it means to be a democratic citizen.
Yet the political promise of self-rule, the basis of both the 1911 revolution and the republic it established, presents two further questions for this model: how "the people" could become effective political actors; and how the erstwhile literati-turned-intellectuals could perform effectively within this new structure of authority. As both ruler and ruled, the "people" as an entity simultaneously act and are acted upon; in other words, their action is supposed to be both normatively authorized and materially effective. The position of the literatus in this triangular relationship therefore becomes compromised: no space is left for his decisive action or political 17 insight, for the very reason that he affirms the capacity of everyone else, not only himself, to rule.
Confronting this new division between the sources of authority, the sources of insight into that authority, and the sources of action, intellectuals in republican China confronted the same tensions between individual theorist and wider community that Pitkin argues only "public freedom" can solve.
One of the most influential interpretations of this new, dual position of "the people," and their relationship to intellectual elite rule, was elaborated by Zhang's frequent interlocutor Liang
Qichao. Liang's early essay "On Self-Rule" (論自治), a component of his magisterial and influential compendium On Renewing the People, explains that "self-rule" will rescue the Chinese people from the mindset that accepts rule by either literati bureaucrats or "hegemons" (authoritarian rulers). However, Liang's definition of the term is more reminiscent of fascism than the democracy he purportedly advocated. To Liang, "to be ruled" meant to be "without disorder," a literally mechanistic metaphor that he applies without distinction to a single body as to a body of persons. 58 Liang compares this group to an "army," by appealing to a Rousseauian general will: "the leader of this army is the law comprised by the inner knowledge of each person's mind." 59 That the law emerges from the mass, rather than one person, somehow makes everyone the leader.
This has the result of theorizing the individual actors out of the picture, substituting their divergent motivations with a reified groupness that Liang deems tractable only to outside forces (that is, foreign domination). 60 This sudden move from individual to group destabilizes the meaning of "self-rule," rendering it not an internally governed impulse as he seems to say at the beginning but a condition of "being in order" that presumes a homogeneity of preference, activity and opinion. Not only does this silence the question of individual motivation, it also makes the group vulnerable to an "ordering" from the outside, either to enforce this homogeneity or to 18 manipulate it without the friction that attends political action in conditions of true plurality. Once the assumption of "self-rule" as a purely group concept is made, the masses again recede into the background of political life. Society is thus rendered simply another external reality, like regional warlords, economic stagnation, or foreign aggression, whose influence was to be borne out, fought against, and perhaps manipulated, but never activated in any political sense. Because the people must be acted-upon before it (or they) can become actor(s), the literatus-bureaucrat is once again cast as a member of a privileged elite that alone possesses a self-motivated capacity for action.
Zhang reverses Liang's typology by asking how the "people," a group in classical philosophy condemned to be effectually inert, can occupy the roles once played by literati. Zhang's most explicit treatment of the identity and implications of non-traditional political actors is found in his 1914 essay "On the Centripetal and Centrifrugal Forces of Government," inspired by an essay of the same name by the English political scientist James Bryce. Zhang's essay is revealing both for how it applies (however superficially) scientific principles to politics, and for how it comes to terms with the variety of "forces" unleashed in Chinese society after the fall of the Qing. From journalists to warlords to local gentry, massive numbers of new political actors responded to the unprecedented political contexts generated by the republican revolution. 61 Rather than dismiss these new actors as enemies of order, Zhang's essay straightforwardly incorporates them as inevitable and potentially useful elements of political life. These forces are defined by their ability to apply what Zhang calls extra-political measures to problems that are not formally recognized by the official regime. Quoting Bryce, Zhang explains that "In politics, we may call the tendency which draws men or groups of men together into one organized community and keeps them there a Centripetal force, and that which makes men, or groups, break away and disperse, a Centrifugal." 62 
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The "centrifrugal" forces of non-traditional actors, Zhang argues, should be balanced by a constitution that integrates their needs and abilities by viewing their activity as politically relevant.
Zhang's adoption of such scientific language for describing how politics and political actors work suggests a deliberate rendering of political activity as a force of nature, which I take to be his first step in incorporating "the people" into the literati model. Like many of his contemporaries, Zhang too invoked Darwinian social theories and the doctrine of evolution to supplement his arguments about politics. Yet using science rather than more interpretive or normative techniques for understanding political life seems to work against Zhang's exhortations to self-awareness. In the process of incorporating non-traditional political actors, Zhang seems to discount, rather than valorize, their contributions to the polity-building project: it casts them as independent variables in a prototypical, behavioralist social science rather than as spontaneous actors whose self-awareness alone can give meaning to the polity they build.
But Zhang may be attempting another kind of transformation here, one that turns on his identity of theorizing with effective political action typified by the literatus posture. Consider why the behavioralist revolution in Western political science has provoked criticism from advocates of more agonistically political conceptions. These theorists warn that scientific terminology applied to politics enacts a categorically incorrect and potentially stultifying conceptual shift: using science to describe or analyze political phenomena edges dangerously close to condemning spontaneous political behavior to the status of a predictable activity, and hence evacuating political actors and activity of their spontaneity, unpredictability, and will. As Sheldon Wolin explained in his seminal essay "Political Theory as a Vocation," these assumptions enforce the same uncritical and ergo "untheoretical" assumptions of prevailing political ideology that justifies the present "authoritative allocation of values" in society. 63 The employment of such "methods" itself transforms the world 20 into the shape the researcher's agenda needs it to be: "the employment of method [i.e., behavioralist political science] assumes, even requires, that the world be of one kind rather than another if techniques are to be effective." 64 Wolin's essay means to criticize the ways in which behavioralism casts the world in its own image, and thus lacks the objectivity it professes. Like Pitkin, Wolin himself maintained an ambivalent position about the status of the theorist, reading theory as both dangerously potent, yet decidedly necessary for seeing otherwise overlooked possibilities for action. 65 Such ambivalence suggests that when Wolin criticizes practitioners of behavioralism for their failure to recognize the bias of their own vision, he also says something else: how we see or "theorize" is integral to establishing our orientation in the world, and that this act of theorizing (including even the initial decision about how to theorize) wreaks indelible changes in the entire structure of fact. 66 In other words, a theory constitutes a method for viewing a situation that remains a highly potent device through which real control can be exercised. It is this more general notion that, despite Wolin's opposition to the scientific vocabulary Zhang employs, is recoverable as a way of articulating how
Zhang expects "self-awareness" to actually work.
Zhang is not "naturalizing" these social forces so as to render them politically intractable (and thus beyond the pale of criticism); he adopts these terms rather to affirm them as actors of political life. Zhang's analysis thus leads him to identify many non-traditional subgroups and individuals as politically significant and as worthy political agents, including most prominently individuals who do not occupy official posts, peasants (especially those involved in uprisings), and factional interests opposed to policies of the ruling party. For Zhang, these sometimes violent interventions in politics should find peaceful yet powerful outlets within a properly designed constitution that allows all comers to "express their ideas and find peace in their own lot," and 21 makes them capable of "achieving their own place." 67 In fact, his identification of these people and groups as "forces" (力) does not disable them from rupturing, challenging or changing the political status quo. The scientific language he adopts here rather legitimates these actors, by underscoring the extent to which these actors are not only politically, but also metaphysically, potent.
Self-awareness contributes to this renovation by articulating both a means of and significance for action taken by non-traditional actors. Earlier scholar-officials sensitive to the plight of the masses, like the heterodox Tang dynasty thinker Liu Zongyuan, simply urged officials to serve the people, without articulating an effective mechanism to make corrupt officials "frightened and obeisant" of the power the people actually possessed. 68 Zhang sees this solution as leading merely to thousands of years of pent-up resentment and oppression, resolvable only by violent uprisings or outright revolution. 69 To change this situation, the people must realize that "the while remaining unable to acknowledge the possibility of "detaching sovereignty for themselves" as a group. 75 Wakeman argues that the longstanding Confucian virtue of dissent and censure-the interpretive mediation between moral and political authority performed by the literatus-was merely a "self-defined right of evaluative dissent" that did not reach beyond individual admonishment to "conceive of group rights" that Wakeman believes could endow them with independence from state control for effective social action. 76 The failure of Chinese scholarofficials to establish politically grounded and defensible rights of collective action also troubles Chang Hao, who pictures would-be Chinese reformers perpetually vacillating between personal self-cultivation as an "inner" location of cosmological authority, on the one hand, and unquestioned obedience to "external," cosmologically sanctioned institutions, on the other, as methods of ameliorating social and political problems. although Zhang sometimes treats self-awareness as both necessary and sufficient to build a political regime, it should not (and probably cannot) dominate the practices that sustain regimes of self-rule:
Zhang's individualist model may potentially create what, using his own words, we could call "centripetal," polity-destroying "forces" that threaten to submerge democratic politics in a regime of either self-absorption or radical impotence. Self-awareness is important but insufficient; in a mature regime, for both normative and empirical reasons, it requires tempering by other values that orient the self to others and their demands.
In other work, Zhang does elaborate a set of such values. 79 I still believe, however, that his concept of self-awareness on its own nevertheless contributes to thinking about political action, especially in conditions of political breakdown. By characterizing action as something that "while based in individual autonomy" is nevertheless "oriented toward solidarity with others," 80 Pitkin
(via a discussion of Arendt) means to affirm the capacity of other individuals to change political environments. Action taken with others seems essential to performing politics as an activity that works with, rather than on, fellow human beings-it is an antidote to the mentality Arendt identified 25 as belonging to homo laborans and a return to the vita activa. 81 Yet Zhang's self-awareness concept reminds us that although politics is about living together with others, specific kinds of political action may require thinking about our efforts in a way that does not take action with others as constitutive (even if, and as, it affirms the potential of others to transform the political landscape).
In this sense, self-awareness is both something to see and a way of seeing, both a vision and a lens. As a vision, it crafts those material and visual environments that mark effective, humaninitiated change. Zhang's juxtaposition of the "self" and "external things," a point I discussed above, reminds us that our material environment also stands to influence, inspire, and shape personal action. The self-aware individual takes actions and affects environments that influence and are influenced by the decisions of others, but it does not take acting with others as definitive of political action or efficacy. This is how self-awareness functions as a lens: it helps us see an old situation in a new way that revises our targets and sources of action. Because other people are no longer what the individual is striving to overcome, they also cannot seen as constant potential inhibitors of his own interests. Disagreement between political actors is not cast as the "problem" that must be resolved before efficacious political action can take place. Instead, the individual can begin from just where he is.
In situations where we "lack the very ideas of action, of politics, of freedom" because no one has "the relevant experience that would make those ideas meaningful," 82 this dual function of self-awareness helps to identify what steps can be taken before spontaneous public action is possible. Zhang explains that these little steps accumulate "like grains of rice in a storehouse,"
beginning from the insight that "selves" are the first actors upon "external things." 83 Asking how self-rule could establish itself in a place like China, which lacked the indigenous traditions that supported its emergence elsewhere, Zhang cannot regard acting together in public in the way Pitkin 26 and Arendt do: it cannot be seen as a "lost treasure," an experience whose eventual return can perhaps emerge from existing vestiges of past practices. 84 Therefore, Zhang's first task is to motivate disparate, internal visions of political community and to explain how their external manifestation, even by one individual in the form of everyday practices, can matter.
Zhang wants us to shift attention away from others toward ourselves-not so as to indulge unreflective and selfish desires, but to guard against shifting to others our own responsibility for change. In an essay further elaborating the connection between self-awareness and polity-building entitled "The State and the Self," Zhang identified "self-confusion" and "shirking one's responsibility" as the twin dangers that arise out of a "negligence of the self" (亡我). These dangers emerge as a result of believing that "the amount of good and bad in the world is not something that can be increased or lessened by one's own involvement." 85 Although potentially indulging our capacity for tyranny, self-awareness nevertheless explains why that danger must be courted:
presuming that action in concert is everywhere always possible, or at least is always the proper orientation for our actions, overdetermines the sources of change. Assuming that the only effective action is action taken with others, Zhang fears, can easily fall into the trap of thinking that "my contribution doesn't matter." In the situation Zhang faced, the danger of individuals failing to take action was far greater than the danger of tyranny that self-awareness may inadvertently produce.
Taken alone, then, self-awareness may underwrite a politics of isolation and alienation:
when one is stuck believing that only one's own actions matter, the mutual relationships and sheer collective energy that sustain a republican political regime are lost, and individuals are driven either to tyranny or (as were many imperial Confucians) eremitism. But there are also dangers to reading political action as always and everywhere culminating in action with others: at best, we risk overlooking the important kinds of self-work that must take place before collective action even 27 makes sense. At worst, we allow ourselves to blame the failure of our ideal world to emerge on those intransigents who refuse to coalesce in collective action toward one's own specified ends.
In republican China, the kinds of subjectivities required by democracy were not necessarily engendered by the Chinese past, by its shared practices, or by recognized co-membership by its citizens in a nominally republican polity. Indeed, under conditions like these, or under those Pitkin and Arendt identified with "the social," the circular relationships that tie individuals to their community just as often replicate past regimes as produce future ones. Self-awareness can rescue political actors in these certain, desperate situations from the paralysis of futility, by explaining why and how personal, microlevel foundations for action do matter. By concentrating on the process individuals undergo in coming to believe that a polity or state is worthy of being willed into existence, Zhang identifies one important way in which personal transformation is intimately linked to political reality and explains why such transformation must necessarily take place on that individual level. In becoming "theorists" in the process of self-awareness to which Zhang exhorts us, we necessarily take on for ourselves the perpetual mediation of the gap between our own efficacy and the wider social order that our efforts bring into being. Indeed, the very power of this action is that it sometimes can and must proceed when one "knows that it cannot be done, but does it anyway" (Analects 14.6) -assuming anything less would mean giving in to the reality one's ideals persist in striving against, a move that would fundamentally disable the efficacy of one's "self-awareness." That the position of this willful individual is tenuous and anxiety-ridden only attests to magnitude of one's power. To paraphrase Pitkin, it is always oneself, and never others, that is simultaneously the hindrance to and the source of all change in the world. Zhang, however, insists that to render this insight an effective motivation for political action, we must realize that it is the "I" that must first act, because it is that same "I" that theorizes. 28 Awareness of the self is needed precisely when politics itself has failed -that is, has failed not in terms of accomplishing some objective, but failed absolutely-but this does not discount its political characteristics. As an important component of transformative action, "self-awareness" provides a potentially fruitful reinterpretation of what we may consider to be "political action." It reorients the focus of political activity away from "action in concert" toward disparate -though cumulative -efforts to render shared problems incrementally and personally tractable, in ways that complement or supplant deliberately coordinated public control. At the very least, this account suggests that the first (but, importantly, not the last or only) question to ask when faced with "drift"
may not be how to communalize our goals and thus build from shared purposes, but how to realize these goals successfully, severally. Whether the accretion of efforts will proceed as Zhang envisioned is a matter of dispute, but it is certainly the case that the reorientation for political action his model provides mitigates the overwhelming odds against our really doing anything.
